A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in the input pro…le. How should it be shared?
Introduction
A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good (which we may think of as money). Each participant contributes a possibly di¤erent type of input; total output is a nondecreasing function of the input pro…le. How should this total output (or gross pro…t) be shared? We search for a simple method that would compute output shares as a function of the input pro…le and the production function.
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The case where inputs are either zero or one -each agent merely chooses whether to participate in the enterprise or not-corresponds to the model of cooperative games. In this much studied framework, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 ) stands out as the central sharing method. It is characterized by the three simple properties of Additivity, Dummy, and Anonymity: output shares depend additively on the production function, totally unproductive agents receive nothing, and equally productive agents get the same share.
We are interested here in the more complex problem where each participant may choose any level of input. Di¤erences in output shares should now re ‡ect not only di¤erences in productivity, as the Shapley value does in the simpler case, but also di¤erences in input levels. For instance, if two agents are equally productive, the one who contributes more should get a bigger share of output.
It is not surprising that in this richer model, Shapley's three axioms, properly reformulated, no longer characterize a unique method: there are di¤erent ways of combining the productivity and the sheer quantity of an input so as to compute the output share it deserves. Three prominent methods emerge from the literature. The Shapley-Shubik method (Shubik, 1962) applies the Shapley value to the so-called stand-alone game in which the worth of a coalition is the output generated by the input pro…le of its members. The Aumann-Shapley method, as adapted from Aumann and Shapley (1974) by Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1982) , gives each agent the integral of his marginal product along the ray from zero to the input pro…le. The serial method (Friedman and Moulin, 1999) integrates the marginal product of each agent along the constrained-diagonal path to the input pro…le. 1 We refer to Friedman and Moulin (1999) for a comparison of these three methods. Moulin (2002) o¤ers a general survey, including a discussion of the (suitable reformulation of the) above methods in the case where inputs come in indivisible units; see also Moulin (1995) and Moulin and Sprumont (2007) .
In order to evaluate the relative merits of these and other methods, it is useful to formulate further axioms. An early example in the literature is Scale Invariance, stating that output shares should not depend on the units of 1 The constrained-diagonal (or constrained-egalitarian) path to an input pro…le x is the projection on [0; x] of the diagonal path z i = z j for all i; j. The method is called serial because it delivers the well-known serial formula of Shenker (1992, 1994 ) when all inputs are perfect substitutes, that is, when total output depends only on the sum of the quantities supplied. measurement of inputs. This axiom is central in the classic characterizations of the Aumann-Shapley method (Billera and Heath, 1982 , and Mirman and Tauman, 1982) .
The very nature of the variable-input model suggests conditions linking output shares in problems with di¤erent input pro…les. Perhaps the simplest such condition is Monotonicity: a participant's share of output should be nondecreasing in his input. Even though preferences are not an explicit component of our model, Monotonicity may be interpreted as an incentivecompatibility condition. Any agent whose preferences are increasing in output and decreasing in his own input would have an incentive to manipulate a method that fails to be monotonic. Moulin (1995) , who introduces the axiom, observes that it is satis…ed by the Shapley-Shubik and the serial methods but is violated by the Aumann-Shapley method. Moulin and Sprumont (2005) strengthen Monotonicity by requiring that a strict increase in all components of the input pro…le of a group of agents should not lead to a strict decrease in the output share of each of them. This is Group Monotonicity. A violation of this axiom leads to the possibility of strategic coordinated input de ‡ation: all agents in some group could get a strictly higher share of output by agreeing to all contribute less input. In a cooperative environment where communication between agents is easy, Group Monotonicity is a compelling incentive-compatibility condition. Moulin and Sprumont (2005) show that the Shapley-Shubik method violates this condition, while the serial method satis…es it.
The purpose of this paper is to identify which methods meeting Shapley's three basic axioms satisfy Group Monotonicity. We work with the discrete version of the output-sharing model. Each agent i's input is an integer x i ; given the input pro…le x and the production function F; our method must allocate the total output F (x).
The best known methods meeting Additivity and Dummy are the path methods. Fix an input pro…le x and consider a sequence fz t g from zero to x where each z t is obtained from its predecessor by increasing the input of exactly one agent by one unit. For any production function F , compute any agent's output share by summing his marginal products along this sequence: agent i thus receives P (F (z t ) F (z t 1 )) where the sum is taken over those t for which z t obtains from z t 1 by increasing i's input by one unit. Under the …xed-path methods, the paths used for di¤erent input pro…les x; x 0 are related: they obtain by projection of a single unbounded path in input space. The so-called …xed- ‡ow methods introduced in Moulin and Sprumont (2005) are essentially the convex combinations of …xed-path methods.
Our …rst result is an axiomatization of the latter methods. We use a new powerful variant of the Dummy axiom, Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, stating that if the productivity of an agent's input is zero beyond a certain level, any increase beyond that level should leave the output shares unchanged. Theorem 1 asserts that Additivity, Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, and the mild requirement of Zero Output for Zero Input characterize the …xed- ‡ow methods.
Building on this result, we explore the implications of Group Monotonicity. As already mentioned, an important example of a group-monotonic method is the serial method. In our discrete model, all the unbounded paths staying as close as possible to the line z i = z j for all i, j qualify as "diagonal"; the serial method (Moulin, 1995) obtains by averaging the corresponding "diagonal" …xed-path methods. Theorem 2 states that the …xed- ‡ow methods satisfying Anonymity and Group Monotonicity are, in a sense that will be made precise, nearly serial: they average …xed-path methods that are all nearly diagonal. Thus our axioms essentially characterize the serial method. We conjecture that an exact characterization holds in the continuous case.
A …nal word is in order about related contributions. Axiomatizations of various methods of the serial family exist in the literature. Moulin and Shenker (1994) characterize the serial formula for the case of perfectly substitutable inputs using an axiom placing upper bounds on output shares. With the aid of a similar axiom, Moulin (1995) and Friedman and Moulin (1999) characterize the serial method in the discrete and continuous contexts respectively. As noted in Moulin and Sprumont (2006) , the Upper Bound axiom is intuitively reminiscent of the very serial formula. By contrast, none of the axioms used in Theorem 2 is directly related to a serial-type formula. Finally, Moulin and Sprumont (2006) o¤er an axiomatization of the serial method based on the property of Distributivity, which states that the sharing method should commute with the composition of production functions. This mathematical property akin to Additivity has no clear normative or strategic interpretation. By contrast, our main axiom, Group Monotonicity, is meaningful on both counts.
The model
Each agent i in a …nite set N = f1; :::; ng contributes an integer quantity x i 2 N = f0; 1; 2; :::g of a personalized input. The output generated by the input pro…le x 2 N N must be split among the members of N: A production function is a mapping F : N N ! R + that is nondecreasing and satis…es F (0) = 0; the set of such mappings is denoted F(N ). A (output-sharing) method (for N ) is a mapping ' which assigns to each problem (F; x) 2 F(N ) N N a vector of nonnegative output shares '(F; x) 2 R N + satisfying the budget balance condition P i2N ' i (F; x) = F (x): An alternative interpretation of this model is to regard x as a demand pro…le and F as a cost function: ' is then a cost-sharing method. We prefer the output-sharing interpretation because we …nd one of our axioms in Section 3, Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, more relevant in that context.
We use the following notation. The set of extended natural numbers is N = N [ f+1g: Vector inequalities are written ; <; . For all x 2 N N and
N , we denote by x S 2 N S the restriction of x to S and write x(S) = P i2S x i : We sometimes write i for fig; ij for fi; jg, and S for N nS. We de…ne e 
whenever z i > 0 and, by convention, @ i F (z) = 0 whenever z i = 0:
The …xed- ‡ow methods
This section proposes a simple axiomatization of the …xed- ‡ow methods introduced in Moulin and Sprumont (2005) . The …rst two axioms are well known, the third is new.
This powerful mathematical property is very convenient in practice. Consider an enterprise producing several goods which it sells on a market. The …nal good to be shared among the participants is money and the total amount is the sum of the sales of the di¤erent goods. One may apply the sharing method directly to the aggregated sales or use it to divide the sales of each good and then add up the resulting shares. If the method is additive, the two procedures are equivalent. This is useful from an incentive viewpoint because the proper level of application of the method is not a matter of dispute.
Our second axiom says that an agent who contributes nothing should receive nothing.
Zero Output for Zero Input. For all F 2 F(N ); x 2 N N , and i 2 N;
Our third axiom is inspired by the traditional Dummy axiom according to which a "dummy", that is, a completely unproductive agent, should receive zero: for all F 2 F(N ); x 2 N N , and i 2 N; f@ i F (z) = 0 for all z 2 N N g ) f' i (F; x) = 0g: Our condition says that "dummy changes" in inputs should have no e¤ect on output shares.
Irrelevance of Dummy Changes. For all F 2 F(N ), x 2 N N ; and i 2 N;
Taken together, Zero Output for Zero Input and Irrelevance of Dummy Changes imply Dummy. In fact, they deliver a stronger property known as Strong Dummy: for all F 2 F(N ); x 2 N N , and i 2 N; f@ i F (z) = 0 for all z 2 N N g ) f' i (F; x) = 0 and ' j (F; x) = ' j (F; (0 i ; x i )) for all j 2 N nig: This says that a dummy agent gets zero and that changes in his input do not a¤ect others'output shares.
In order to describe the methods meeting Additivity, Zero Output for Zero Input, and Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, we use Moulin and Vohra's (2003) characterization of the methods satisfying Additivity and Dummy.
where N (z; x) = fi 2 N jz i < x i g: Conditions (1) are the so-called ‡ow conservation constraints. A ‡ow system is a list f = ff (:; x)jx 2 N N g; where each f (:; x) is a ‡ow to x: Lemma 1 (Moulin and Vohra, 2003) . Let N be an arbitrary …nite set of agents. An output-sharing method ' for N satis…es Additivity and Dummy if and only if there is a ‡ow system f such that
This system f is unique.
We say that the ‡ow system f represents '. Notice that all methods characterized in Lemma 1 guarantee Zero Output for Zero Input. Observe also that ‡ows to di¤erent input pro…les need not be related.
We will be concerned with ‡ow systems where the ‡ow to an input pro…le is simply the projection of the ‡ow to any higher input pro…le. We de…ne the projection operator in full generality as this will be useful in the proof of Theorem 2. Let De…nition 2. A …xed ‡ow system is a ‡ow system f such that
A method ' is a …xed- ‡ow method if it is represented by a …xed ‡ow system.
The …xed- ‡ow methods were de…ned in Moulin and Sprumont (2005) under the restriction that input pro…les are bounded above by some x 2 N N : In that case, the single ‡ow f (:; x) and the projection property (3) fully determine the entire ‡ow system f . In our unbounded version, the ‡ow f (:; x) to any input pro…le x completely determines the ‡ows to all input pro…les x 0 x: In particular, the system f is completely determined by the subsystem ff (:; ke N )jk 2 Ng. Theorem 1. Let N be an arbitrary …nite set of agents. An output-sharing method ' for N satis…es Additivity, Zero Output for Zero Input, and Irrelevance of Dummy Changes if and only if ' is a …xed- ‡ow method.
Proof. The "if" statement is easily checked. To prove the converse statement, …x a method ' meeting the three axioms. Because Zero Output for Zero Input and Irrelevance of Dummy Changes imply Dummy, Lemma 1 applies: let f be the unique ‡ow system representing ' through formula (2) . We show that f is a …xed ‡ow system. In order to establish property (3), it is enough to prove that
This is because
x; as is clear from the de…nition of the projection operator.
The proof of (4) makes use of the following particular type of production function. For all i 2 N and z 2 N N such that z i > 0, we de…ne z on agent j and using the representation formula (2),
Fix j 2 N ni and z 2 [0; x] such that z i = x i : Let F be the production function such that
This production function is easily constructed: de…ne it …rst on those input pro…les such that z i = 0 by modifying the procedure in (5), then extend it to all pro…les by setting
Applying the representation formula (2),
Taking Claim 2 into account, this means that
Claims 1, 2 and 3 together imply (4).
The axioms in Theorem 1 are independent. This follows directly from the independence of the axioms used in Theorem 2, which is established in the Section 5.
The nearly serial methods
Building on the previous section, we now show how two further axioms, Anonymity and Group Monotonicity, circumscribe the very small subclass of …xed- ‡ow methods that we call nearly serial.
We begin by de…ning Anonymity. Denote by (N ) the set of bijections from N into itself and let 2 (N ).
Anonymity. For all 2 (N ); F 2 F(N ), and
This axiom expresses the familiar idea that the names of the agents should be ignored when computing the output shares: it is generally accepted as a basic notion of fairness. Our formulation implies weaker symmetry properties used in the literature: for instance, agents with equal input receive the same output share when the production function is symmetric.
Lemma 2. Let N be an arbitrary …nite set of agents. An output-sharing method ' for N satisfying Additivity and Dummy meets Anonymity if and only if its ‡ow system f satis…es f ( z; x) = f (z; x) for all x 2 N N ; z 2 [0; x]; and 2 (N ).
Proof. Su¢ ciency is clear from the representation formula (2). Conversely, suppose ' meets Additivity, Dummy and Anonymity; let f be its ‡ow system. 
Focusing now on …xed- ‡ow methods, let k 2 N and consider the input pro…le ke N where all agents contribute k units. We say that a ‡ow f (:; ke
Taking into account the remark following De…nition 2, it follows from Lemma 2 that a …xed- ‡ow method ' meets Anonymity if and only if each ‡ow f (:; ke N ); k 2 N, is anonymous. We then say that the …xed ‡ow system f is anonymous.
We introduce now the serial and nearly serial methods. In order to do so, we need some further de…nitions.
we call these sets the diagonal and near-diagonal of N N : If f (:; x) is a ‡ow to an input pro…le x 2 N N ; the set S(f; x) = fz 2 [0; x]jf (z; x) 6 = 0g is called the support of f (:; x). For all k 2 N, a ‡ow f (:; ke
A quick description of D < and D may be useful. For all t 2 N; de…ne
If t is a multiple of n, say t = rn for some r 2 N; then D < (t) = fre N g: If t = rn + 1 for some r 2 N; D < (t) is made up of all permutations of the point (r + 1; r; :::; r): More generally, if t = rn + k for some r 2 N and k 2 f1; :::; n 1g; D < (t) is made up of all permutations of the point (r + 1)e f1;:::;kg + re fk+1;:::;ng : The set D (t) coincides with D < (t) whenever t is not a positive multiple of n: If t is a positive multiple of n, say t = rn for some r 2 Nnf0g; then
It contains all points that can be written as (r+1)e f1;:::kg +re fk+1;:::;n kg +(r 1)e fn k+1;:::;ng for some integer k; 0 k n 2
(with the understanding that e ; = 0), and all their permutations.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate D
< and D when n = 2 and 3 respectively.
It is well known that there is only one anonymous ‡ow to the one-unitinput pro…le e N , namely
where n i (z) = jfj 2 N ni j z j = 1gj : As an illustration, Figure 3 depicts f S (:; e f1;2;3g ): On the subset f(F; e N ) j F 2 F(N )g (that is, on the problems corresponding to standard cooperative games), the ‡ow f This method was proposed by Moulin (1995) . When all inputs are perfect substitutes, that is, when the production function takes the form F (z) = e F (z(N )) for some function e F from N to R + , it reduces to the well-known serial mechanism (Moulin and Shenker, 1992) : assuming without loss of generality that x 1 x 2 ::: x n ; the output shares are
The methods we will characterize are only slight variations of the serial method.
De…nition 5. A nearly serial method is an output-sharing method represented by an anonymous nearly diagonal …xed ‡ow system.
While there are several anonymous nearly diagonal …xed ‡ow systems, they form a rather small family. Each such system f is conveniently represented by a single anonymous nearly diagonal unbounded ‡ow, that is, a mapping f :
and
For all
An anonymous nearly diagonal unbounded ‡ow f is a relatively simple object.
If t is not a multiple of n, recall that D (t) = D < (t); which is a perfectly symmetric set: each element of D < (t) is a permutation of any other element of D < (t) (see Figure 2 for an illustration). In that case the restriction S(f ) \ (t) D (t) and the anonymity condition (10) imply that
and therefore f is completely determined on (t) once it is determined on (t 1): When t is a positive multiple of n; then D (t) is a strict superset of D < (t) but S(f ) \ (t) is necessarily a rather small subset of D (t). In fact, for all r 2 Nnf0g and z 2 S(f ) \ (rn); z = re N or z is a permutation of (r + 1)e 1 + re f2;:::;n 1g + (r 1)e n ;
that is, S(f ) \ (rn) is included in the union of a singleton and a perfectly symmetric set. This follows from the ‡ow conservation constraints (9) combined with the fact that S(f )
is the fraction of the total (unit) ‡ow that goes through re N : This is illustrated in Figure 5 
We now come to our central axiom and our main result. We ask that when all agents in a group increase their input, not all of them get less output.
Group Monotonicity. For all F 2 F(N ), all x; x 0 2 N N ; and all nonempty S N; fx i < x 0 i for all i 2 S and
This property is a natural generalization of the standard Monotonicity axiom, which corresponds to the case where S is a singleton. As discussed in the Introduction, Group Monotonicity is best defended from the strategic angle. In a context where agents can easily coordinate their actions, the condition is necessary to prevent joint decreases in inputs. It is also su¢ cient if monetary transfers between agents can be credibly forbidden. Otherwise, a stronger condition becomes necessary: a coordinated reduction of inputs by a group of agents should never lead to a bigger aggregate output share for that group. This Strong Group Monotonicity condition is studied in Moulin and Sprumont (2005) who show in their Proposition 2 that it is incompatible with the combination of Additivity and Dummy if there are at least three agents. Moulin and Sprumont (2005) prove that the serial method satis…es Group Monotonicity. In fact, it passes the test "with a slack": if the agents in S all decrease their input, one checks that all agents with minimal input in S get an output share smaller than or equal to their original share. This suggests that more methods could be group-monotonic. As it turns out, the other nearly serial methods also satisfy Group Monotonicity -but "barely": it may happen that only some agent with minimal input in S su¤ers an output share reduction. No other method satisfying our other conditions passes the test.
Theorem 2. Let
Proof. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a set of agents, n 3:
"If". Let ' be a nearly serial method for N: The only statement requiring a proof is that ' satis…es Group Monotonicity. Let f be the unbounded ‡ow representing '. Since it is anonymous and nearly diagonal, f is fully characterized by a sequence of weights f r g as in (11) . Let 
For ease of exposition, we give the argument for the case of three agents …rst. 
Suppose that x 1 < x 2 : Because f is nearly diagonal, (12) and (13) give
It follows that ' 1 (F; x) ' 1 (F; x 0 ): Permuting the roles of 1 and 2, the same argument shows that ' 2 (F; x) ' 2 (F; x 0 ) when x 2 < x 1 .
Case 2.
For r = 0; 1; :::; x 3 , de…ne X(r) = fz 2 [0; x] j z 3 = rg and X 0 (r)
and y
In order to compare ' i (F; x) with ' i (F; x 0 ), we will compare y i (r) with y 0 i (r) for all r = 0; 1; :::; x 3 : This requires computing the mappings g 12 j X(r) and g 0 12 j X 0 (r) for all r. If r < x 3 ; these mappings are obtained by projecting respectively on X(r) and X 0 (r) the restriction of f 12 to Z(r) = fz 2 N f1;2;3g j z 3 = rg. Formally,
For all r 2 Nnf0g; the mapping f 12 j Z(r) in (16) is fully determined by the three numbers r 1 ; r ; r+1 : f 1 (r; r; r) = f 1 (r + 1; r; r) = ; f 1 (2; 1; 0) = ; f 1 (:; :; 0) = 0 otherwise, and f 2 (:; :; 0) obtains by permutation.
If r = x 3 ; the mappings g 12 j X(x 3 ) and g 0 12 j X 0 (x 3 ) are obtained by projecting on X(x 3 ) and X 0 (x 3 ) the …rst two components of the unbounded ‡ow f in or above Z(x 3 ): letting Z (x 3 ) = fz 2 N f1;2;3g j z 3 x 3 g; we have g 12 j X(
It is convenient to compute these mappings in two steps. First we compute p Z(x 3 ) (f 12 j Z (x 3 ) ): Denoting this mapping h 12 , we …nd h 1 (x 3 1; x 3 1; x 3 ) = 1
for all m 2 Nnf0g; h 1 (x 3 ; x 3 + 1; x 3 ) = 1
6 for all m 2 Nnf0g; and we obtain h 2 by permutation. The mapping h 12 is illustrated on Figure  8 . The second step consists in projecting this mapping on X(x 3 ) and X 0 (x 3 ) to obtain g 12 j X(x 3 ) = p X(x 3 ) h 12 and g
We are now ready to compare y i (r) with y 0 i (r) for i 2 f1; 2g and all possible values of r: We make two claims. In both claims, r 2 f0; :::; x 3 g and denotes the common value of x 1 and x 2 : Claim 1. If r 6 = minf ; x 3 g; then y i (r) y 0 i (r) for all i 2 f1; 2g: There are only two possibilities.
1.1. r < x 3 and r 6 = : The mappings g 12 j X(r) and g 0 12 j X 0 (r) are given by (16) , with the mapping f 12 j Z(r) shown on Figure 7 . Recall that X(r) = fz 2 [0; x] j z 3 = rg; where x = ( ; ; x 3 ): Because r 6 = ; we have either r 1 or r + 1: In either case, we …nd that g 12 and g 0 12 coincide on X(r); namely, g 12 (z) = g 0 12 (z) = f 12 (z) for all z 2 X(r): The claim follows from (14) and (15).
< r = x 3 :
The mappings g 12 j X(r) = g 12 j X(x 3 ) and g 0 12 j X 0 (r) = g 0 12 j X 0 (x 3 ) are now given by (17) with the mapping h 12 illustrated on Figure 8 . Because < x 3 ; these mappings coincide on X(x 3 ), that is, g 12 (z) = g 0 12 (z) for all z 2 X(x 3 ); and the claim follows again from (14) and (15). 
r = < x 3 :
The mappings g 12 j X(r) = g 12 j X( ) and g 
and obtain corresponding expressions for y 2 ( ) and y 0 2 ( ) by permuting the …rst and second argument of the production function.
Taking di¤erences,
Suppose now, contrary to the claim, that y ; these mappings need not coincide on X(x 3 ) but the argument in 2.1 can be mimicked with g 12 j X(x 3 ) and g 0 12 j X 0 (x 3 ) replacing g 12 j X( ) and g 0 12 j X 0 ( ) ; respectively. Claims 1 and 2 together establish that ' i (F; x) ' i (F; x 0 ) for some i 2 f1; 2g when x 1 = x 2 = ; completing the proof of Group Monotonicity when n = 3.
Proof for any n 3:
De…ne T = fi 2 S j x i x j for all j 2 Sg: Since S 6 = N; N nT 6 = ;:
Because f is nearly diagonal, (12) and (13) give
and it follows that ' i (F; x) ' i (F; x 0 ):
Case 2. T is not a singleton. By de…nition, all agents in T contribute the same number of units, say,
where
In order to compare ' i (F; x) with ' i (F; x 0 ), we will compare y i (r N nT ) with y
By construction, this mapping is nearly diagonal with respect to T : if
Moreover, h T is anonymous with respect to T : for all (z T ; r N nT ) 2 Z(r N nT ) and any permutation on T , h T ( z T ; r N nT ) = h T (z T ; r N nT ): Finally, by (12) and (13),
and g
We are now ready to compare y i (r N nT ) with y 
Indeed, it then follows that for all i 2 T; y
We distinguish two cases.
1.1. For all i 2 N nT; r i < x i . In this case, the assumption r N nT 6 = e N N nT^x N nT implies r i 6 = for some i 2 N nT:
Because M < = N nT and M = = ;; we have Z (r N nT ) = Z(r N nT ) and h T = p Z(r N nT ) (f T j Z(r N nT ) ) = f T j Z(r N nT ) : Hence (18) and (19) become
Without loss of generality, suppose T = f1; :::; tg and N nT = ft + 1; :::; ng ; 1 < t < n: Because f is a nearly diagonal unbounded ‡ow, we need only consider the following three cases: If none of these cases prevails, then there is no z T such that (z T ; r N nT ) 2 S(f ); that is, f (z) = 0 for all z 2 Z(r N nT ); and (20) follows trivially from (22) and (23).
In case (a), (z T ; r N nT ) 2 S(f ) only if z T = (k; :::; k): In such a case however, f T (z T ; r N nT ) = 0: Indeed, if, say f 1 (z T ; r N nT ) 6 = 0; then (z T ; r N nT ) e 1 = (k 1; k; :::k; k + 1; k; :::; k; k 1) 2 S(f ); a contradiction to the fact that f is nearly diagonal. Thus f T (z) = 0 for all z 2 Z(r N nT ) and therefore (20) follows from (22) and (23).
In case (b), (z T ; r N nT ) 2 S(f ) only if one of the following statements holds: i) z T is a permutation of (k + 2)e 1 T + (k + 1)e f2;:::;tg T ; say, z T = (k + 2; k + 1; :::; k + 1); ii) z T = (k + 1)e T T ; which we write z T = (k + 1; :::; k + 1); iii) z T is a permutation of (k + 1)e f1;:::;pg T + ke fp+1;:::;tg T where 1 p < t; say, z T = (k + 1; :::; k + 1; k; :::; k); iv) z T = ke T T ; which we write z T = (k; :::; k); v) z T is a permutation of (k 1)e 1 T + ke f2;:::;tg T ; say, z T = (k 1; k; :::; k): Observe that z T always belongs not only to the near diagonal of N T , but to the diagonal of N T ; D Observe that z T does not necessarily belong to the diagonal of N T but z T 2 fk 1; k; k + 1g
T : Now we use (21). Since r N nT = (k; :::; k); it follows that 6 = k; that is,
for all z 2 X(r N nT ); and (20) follows. 1.2. There exists i 2 N nT such that r i = x i : In this case, M = 6 = ? and we assume without loss of generality that T = f1; :::; tg and M = = fm + 1; :::; ng ; where t m < n. Also without loss, we suppose x i x n for all i 2 M = : Thus we have r N nT = (r M < ; x M = ) and the assumption r N nT 6 = e N N nT^x N nT means that < x n or there exists i 2 M < such that r i 6 = .
We distinguish two subcases.
The argument in this subcase mimics the argument in 1.1. Again, we need only consider three cases:
(a) r M < is a permutation of (k + 1; k; :::; k; k 1) for some k 2 Nnf0g; (b) r M < is a permutation of (k + 1; :::; k + 1; k; :::; k) for some k 2 N; (c) r M < = (k; :::; k) for some k 2 N:
If none of these cases prevails, there does not exist z T 2 N T and z M = x M = such that f (z T ; r M < ; z M = ) 6 = 0; hence h T (z) = 0 for all z 2 Z(r M < ; x M = ) and (20) follows from (22) and (23).
In case (a), there exist z T 2 N T and z M = x M = such that f (z T ; r M < ; z M = ) 6 = 0 only if z T = (k; :::; k): In this case however, h T (z T ; r M < ; z M = ) = 0 and again (20) follows from (22) and (23).
T : Now we use the fact that r i 6 = for some i 2 M < . Since r M < = (k; :::; k); it follows that 6 = k; that is,
In this case (24) implies that x n 1:
From (26) we have z T (x n 2)e T T : It follows that
because if, say, z 1 = x n 2; then (26) implies z j = x n 1 for all j 2 T n1; hence (z T e j T ; r M < ; x M = ) = 2 pD for all j 2 T; contradicting (27). Now assume, (18) and (19) yield
where n(n 1) is the number of permutations of the point ( + 1)e 1 + e f2;:::;n 1g + ( 1)e n . Suppose, by contradiction, that y
] for all i 2 T: Summing up these inequalities,
But since F is nondecreasing,
for all i 2 T; j 2 T ni; a contradiction.
2.2.
Dispensing now with the assumption e N N nT
x N nT ; let r N nT = e N N nT^x N nT . Because h T is nearly diagonal and anonymous with respect to T , we obtain
where A is a coe¢ cient that does not depend on i. If y 0 i (r N nT ) < y i (r N nT ) for all i 2 T; a contradiction is obtained just as before.
"Only if". Let ' be an output-sharing method for N meeting all …ve axioms in Theorem 2. Recalling Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, ' is represented by a unique anonymous …xed ‡ow system f: We will prove by induction on n that f is nearly diagonal.
Step 1. f is nearly diagonal if n = 3:
We …x N = f1; 2; 3g and claim that S(f; ke N ) D for all k 2 Nnf0g: To prove our claim it su¢ ces to show 8k 2 Nnf0g; 8t 2 Nnf0g such that t k; S(f; ke From now on, we …x k 2 Nnf0g and (with a slight abuse of notation) write f instead of f (:; ke N ): We show by induction on t that S(f ) \ (t) D (t) for all t 2 Nnf0g:
If t = 1; the anonymity of f directly implies that
Next we …x t, 2 t k, assume S(f ) \ ( ) D ( ) for = 1; :::; t 1; and show that S(f ) \ (t) D (t): Given z 2 N N nf0g; we call f (z) = (f 1 (z); f 2 (z); f 3 (z)) the ‡ow at z: By the ‡ow at a set Z we mean the collection ff (z) j z 2 Zg. We distinguish three cases. Case 1. t = 3r + 1 for some r 2 Nnf0g.
Then D (t) = f(r; r; r + 1); (r; r + 1; r); (r + 1; r; r)g : By the induction hypothesis, S(f ) \ (3r) D (3r): The latter set is made up of 7 points: (r; r; r) and the 6 permutations of (r 1; r; r + 1). The induction hypothesis also ensures that S(f ) \ (3r 1) D (3r 1); which is made up of the three permutations of (r 1; r; r): By anonymity of f , the ‡ow at D (3r) is therefore determined up to one parameter 2 [0; 1] : f (r; r; r) = ( 3 ; 3 ; 3 );
f (r 1; r; r + 1) = (0; 0; 1 6 );
and the ‡ow at each permutation of (r 1; r; r + 1) obtains by applying that permutation to f (r 1; r; r + 1): See Figure 10 . We want to show that
where D (3r + 1) is made up of the three permutations of (r; r; r + 1): By the induction hypothesis, ‡ow conservation and the anonymity of f , it su¢ ces to show that f 1 (r + 1; r + 1; r 1) = 0
and f 1 (r + 2; r; r 1) = 0:
The ‡ow at D (3r + 1) is then fully determined by ‡ow conservation: f (r + 1; r; r) = ( 3 ; ; ) and the ‡ow at the permuted points obtains by permutation. See Figure 11 .
Proving (30). Suppose, by way of contradiction, f 1 (r + 1; r + 1; r 1) = f 2 (r + 1; r + 1; r 1) = ; 0 < : Write g = f (:; (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1)); the projection of f on [0; (r + 1)e N ]; and note that g is fully determined. In particular, g(r + 1; r 1; r + 1) = ( ; 0; ); g(r 1; r + 1; r + 1) = (0; ; ); and g(r; r; r + 1) = ( ; 3 ): De…ne the production function F by F (w) = 1 if w z for some z 2 f(r; r; r + 1); (r + 1; r 1; r + 1); (r 1; r + 1; r + 1)g and F (w) = 0 otherwise. Then ' 1 (F; (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1)) = ' 2 (F; (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1)) = ( : But using the …xed- ‡ow property, compute now ' 1 (F; (r; r; r +1)) = g 1 (r; r; r +1)+g 1 (r; r +1; r +1) = ( + ; which is also ' 2 (F; (r; r; r + 1)) by Anonymity. This violates Group Monotonicity. See Figure 12 .
We have proved (30). In fact, we have shown more, namely g(r + 1; r + 1; r 1) = (0; 0; 0): As a consequence, by ‡ow conservation, g 3 (r + 1; r + 1; r) = 0:
Proving (31). Suppose f 1 (r + 2; r; r 1) = f 2 (r; r + 2; r 1) = ; 0 < 1 6 : De…ne the production function F 0 by F 0 (w) = 1 if w z for some z 2 f(r + 1; r + 1; r); (r + 2; r; r); (r; r + 2; r)g and F 0 (w) = 0 otherwise. See Figure 13 . De…ne W = (r; r + 2; r); (r + 1; r + 1; r); (r + 2; r; r); (r + 1; r + 2; r); (r + 2; r + 1; r); (r + 2; r + 2; r) :
This set contains all the input pro…les below (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1) where agent 3's marginal product is positive. In fact, @ 3 F 0 (w) = 1 if w 2 W and @ 3 F 0 (w) = 0 for all w 2 [0; (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1)] nW: By the representation formula (2), therefore, ' 3 (F 0 ; (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1)) = g 3 (r + 1; r + 1; r) = 0:
Now let g 0 = f (:; (r+2; r+2; r)); the projection of f on [0; (r + 2; r + 2; r)] : By the …xed- ‡ow property, g 0 1 (r + 2; r; r 1) = f 1 (r + 2; r; r 1) = and g 0 2 (r; r + 2; r 1) = f 2 (r; r + 2; r 1) = : Moreover, g 0 3 (r + 1; r + 1; r) = g 3 (r + 1; r + 1; r) = 0: By (2), ' 3 (F 0 ; (r + 2; r + 2; r)) = P w2W g 0 3 (w) = P w2W n(r+1;r+1;r) g 0 3 (w): By ‡ow conservation, P w2W n(r+1;r+1;r) g 0 3 (w) g 0 1 (r+ 2; r; r 1)+ g 0 2 (r; r+2; r 1) = 2 > 0; hence, ' 3 (F 0 ; (r+2; r+2; r)) > 0: Since every …xed- ‡ow method satis…es Monotonicity, ' 3 (F 0 ; (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1)) ' 3 (F 0 ; (r + 2; r + 2; r)) > 0: Thus, ' 3 (F 0 ; (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1)) > ' 3 (F 0 ; (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1)): But F 0 (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1) = F 0 (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1) = 1: Using budget balance and Anonymity, it follows that ' i (F 0 ; (r+2; r+2; r+1)) < ' i (F 0 ; (r+1; r+1; r+1)) for i = 1; 2; violating Group Monotonicity.
Case 2. t = 3r + 2 for some r 2 N.
Then D (t) = f(r; r + 1; r + 1); (r + 1; r; r + 1); (r + 1; r + 1; r)g : By the induction hypothesis, S(f ) \ (3r + 1) D (3r + 1) and by anonymity of f , the ‡ow at D (3r +1) is as shown in Figure 11 : f (r +1; r; r) = ( 3 ;
) and the the ‡ow at the permuted points obtains by permutation. We claim now that
Because of the anonymity of f , we need only show f 1 (r + 2; r; r) = 0:
Suppose f 1 (r + 2; r; r) = ; 0 < : De…ne the production function F 00 by F 00 (w) = 1 if w z for some z 2 f(r +1; r +1; r +1); (r +2; r; r +1); (r; r + : On the other hand, by the …xed- ‡ow property and ‡ow conservation, ' 3 (F 00 ; (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1)) + (
) + (
: So ' i (F 00 ; (r + 1; r + 1; r + 1)) > ' i (F 00 ; (r + 2; r + 2; r + 1)) for i = 1; 2; contradicting Group Monotonicity. This proves (32). Note that the anonymity of f completely determines the entire ‡ow at D (3r + 2): f 1 (r + 1; r + 1; r) = f 2 (r + 1; r + 1; r) = f 1 (r + 1; r; r + 1) = f 3 (r + 1; r; r + 1) = f 2 (r; r + 1; r + 1) = f 3 (r; r + 1; r + 1) = 1 6 ; as depicted on Figure 15 . Case 3. t = 3r for some r 2 Nnf0g.
Then D (t) = f(r; r; r); (r 1; r; r + 1); (r 1; r + 1; r); (r; r 1; r + 1); (r; r+1; r 1); (r+1; r 1; r); (r+1; r; r 1)g: By the induction hypothesis, S(f ) \ (3r 1) D (3r 1) (and the ‡ow at D (3r 1) is as shown on Figure 16 ). It follows directly from ‡ow conservation that S(f ) \ (3r) D (3r): Moreover, by anonymity of f , the ‡ow at D (3r) must be as shown on Figure 10 : f (r; r; r) = ( 3 ; 3 ; 3 ); f (r 1; r; r + 1) = (0; 0; 1 6 ); and the ‡ow at each permutation of (r 1; r; r + 1) obtains by applying that permutation to f (r + 1; r; r 1):
Step 2. Induction argument.
Let N = f1; :::; ng; n > 3: Make the induction hypothesis that for all M N such that 3 jM j < n; every output-sharing method for M satisfying our …ve axioms is a nearly serial method. Let ' be an output-sharing method for N satisfying the …ve axioms. Let f be the ‡ow system representing '. Because of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, f is an anonymous …xed ‡ow system. We must prove that it is nearly diagonal.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist k > 0; z 2 S(f; ke N ), and i 2 N such that
We claim that
To prove (34), decompose (33) into two cases: either z i z(N ) n > 1 or z(N ) n z i > 1: We only consider the former case, the latter is similar and left to the reader. Without loss of generality, assume i = 1; so that (n 1)z 1 > z(N n1) + n:
Discussion
We make four comments about Theorem 2.
1) It is easy to see that the axioms are independent. For a method satisfying all axioms but Additivity, consider the following adjusted proportional method. Given a problem (F; x) ; de…ne a iF = minfa i j@ i F (z) = 0 for all z such that z i a i g (with the convention that a iF = +1 if the latter set is empty) and let x iF = minfx i ; a iF g: De…ne ' i (F; x) = Observe that this condition does not imply Monotonicity. This is obvious for n = 2 since Pairwise Monotonicity is then implied by budget balance and therefore automatically satis…ed by all output-sharing methods. For n 3; consider the following method '. For all F 2 F(N ) and x 12 2 N N nf1;2g ; de…ne F x 12 : N f1;2g ! R + by F x 12 (z 1 ; z 2 ) = F (z 1 ; z 2 ; x 12 ) F (0; 0; x 12 ): Clearly, F x 12 2 F(f1; 2g): For all (F; x) 2 F(N ) N N ; let ' i (F; x) = 0 for i 2 N n f1; 2g and ' i (F; x) = 1 2 F (0; 0; x 12 ) + ' AS i (F x 12 ; (x 1 ; x 2 )) for i 2 N n f1; 2g ; where '
AS denotes the Aumann-Shapley method (see Sprumont, 2005 for a formal de…nition in the discrete framework). The method ' meets Pairwise Monotonicity because agents 1 and 2 always share the entire output and the others always get zero. To see that ' violates Monotonicity, consider a pro…le where x 12 = 0 and use any example showing that the (two-agent) Aumann-Shapley method is not monotonic (see, for instance, Moulin, 1995) .
3) We have assumed that the domain of a sharing method is F(N ) N N ; where F(N ) contains all nondecreasing real-valued functions on N N satisfying F (0) = 0: On smaller domains, the nearly serial methods need not be the only methods satisfying the …ve axioms in Theorem 2. For instance, the Shapley-Shubik method is group monotonic if we restrict our attention to production functions F that are submodular (in the sense that @ i F (z + e j ) @ i F (z) for all z and distinct i; j). We have not identi…ed interesting subdomains on which Theorem 2 continues to hold. More generally, little is known about the validity of most results in the additive theory of output sharing on restricted domains, including Lemma 1, which is crucial for the proofs of our two theorems. 4) We repeat that the nearly serial methods form a very small class. In the continuous model (where inputs are measured in real numbers), these methods have no natural counterpart: we conjecture that the …ve axioms in Theorem 2 characterize precisely Friedman and Moulin's (1999) serial method. Friedman's (2004) representation theorem (stating that the methods meeting Additivity and Dummy are convex combinations of path methods) should prove useful in tackling this conjecture.
